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INTRODUCTION 
This case involves claims brought by Mark Jones ("Jones") and his company, 
Mark Technologies Corp. ("MTC"), arising from a Settlement Agreement entered in June 
of 1996. Part of the Settlement Agreement, which involved multiple parties and settled 
multiple lawsuits, was an accompanying Stock Purchase Agreement under which John 
Fife ("Fife") and his company, Inter-Mountain Capital Corp., would acquire a majority of 
the outstanding shares of stock in Utah Resources International, Inc. ("URI"). Shortly 
after execution of the Settlement Agreement, however, it became apparent to Jones and 
MTC that URI, under Fife's leadership, was unwilling to abide by many of the express 
terms of the Settlement Agreement. Jones and MTC made a series of demands on URI 
and Fife to comply with various terms of the Settlement Agreement and were routinely 
met with stonewalling, inaction, or outright refusal. Ultimately, Jones and MTC filed this 
lawsuit as a last resort means of obtaining the benefit of what they had bargained for in 
the Settlement Agreement. 
URI responded to the lawsuit in part by belatedly complying with some of the key 
provisions of the Settlement Agreement. After receipt of the Complaint, URI finally 
entered a written employment contract-albeit a hasty and incomplete one-with Fife, and 
it obtained waivers of certain stock options that were erroneously added in the Settlement 
Agreement as being granted to Lyle D. Hurd, Jr. ("Hurd") and Gerry Brown ("Brown"). 
URI moved to dismiss Jones and MTC's claim regarding its obligation to unwind its 
relationship with Morgan Gas and Oil Co. ("MGO") on procedural grounds, and when 
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the Motion was denied, it immediately began winding up the relationship, a process that 
took less than five weeks. 
Ultimately, the matter came before the trial court on cross motions for summary 
judgment, and the trial court dismissed the case. Although the trial court's legal basis for 
dismissal of each claim was independently stated, the themes of the trial court's ruling 
were primarily that Jones and MTC did not have standing to enforce the rights for which 
they had bargained under the Settlement Agreement and that Jones and MTC had suffered 
no significant injury, particularly since URI's post-lawsuit actions had rendered the 
claims moot. 
Jones and MTC have brought this appeal to correct the errors of the trial court in 
refusing to acknowledge Jones and MTC's rights under the Settlement Agreement and in 
failing to acknowledge the disputed issues of fact presented on the record. Jones and 
MTC urge this Court to reverse the Judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for 
a trial on the merits as to Claims One through Five, Seven and Ten of the Amended 
Complaint. 
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE APPEAL 
The Statement of the Case set forth in Jones and MTC's principal brief adequately 
addresses the factual basis for the Arguments herein, particularly in light of the fact that 
URI has not undertaken to controvert any of these facts in its own Statement of the Case. 
Therefore, Jones will not restate the facts here, except to respond to a few specific factual 
assertions set forth in URI's brief. 
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URI dedicates substantial space in its brief to describing the intentions of the 
parties in negotiating and signing the Settlement Agreement. This narrative is apparently 
offered as support for the proposition that Jones is not a party to the Stock Purchase 
Agreement and is not entitled to enforce its terms. Jones and MTC would merely note 
that virtually none of the narrative is supported by the record, and that they strongly 
dispute the suggestion that they were not intended to have the right to enforce the terms 
of the Stock Purchase Agreement that are expressly incorporated in the Settlement 
Agreement. 
URI also asserts that because each claim of Jones and MTC's Complaint 
incorporates all other allegations of the Complaint, all claims of the Complaint are 
therefore deemed to arise out of the Settlement Agreement. Jones and MTC are aware of 
no authority for the proposition that a reference by which the factual allegations of one 
claim are incorporated into another transforms the legal theory and factual basis of one 
claim into that of another. Jones and MTC submit that the character of each claim for 
relief must be determined from the legal theory upon which the claim is based and the 
factual allegations relevant thereto. The fact that other factual allegations of the 
Complaint are incorporated as part of the claim is not determinative. 
In its brief, URI also discusses the action currently pending in St. George, Utah, 
which was mentioned by the Court in dismissing Jones and MTC's Ninth Claim for 
Relief. Jones submits that the Ninth Claim for Relief is not a subject of this appeal, and 
the St. George action is thus irrelevant to these proceedings. 
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Because URI's Statement of the Case does not directly controvert the facts set 
forth in Jones and MTC's brief, all factual disputes relevant to the issues on appeal will 
be discussed further in the context of the Argument below. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS 
REGARDING FIFE'S EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT. 
In its brief, URI concedes that it did not enter a written employment agreement 
with Fife until after the lawsuit was filed. URI also concedes, at least tacitly, that but for 
the lawsuit, URI would not have entered the written employment Agreement. Instead, 
URI defends the trial court's dismissal of the First Claim for Relief on two levels: (1) that 
under the plain language of the Settlement Agreement, Jones had no right to sue under the 
Stock Purchase Agreement; and (2) that URI's failure to enter a written employment 
contract was not a breach. 
With regard to Jones and MTC's standing to sue, the Defendants correctly point 
out that the Stock Purchase Agreement was between URI and IMC. (Br. 12). Defendants 
fail to acknowledge, however, that the purpose of the Settlement Agreement was to allow 
interested parties, including Jones and MTC, to establish the terms under which IMC 
would be allowed to purchase shares of URI stock. The Stock Purchase Agreement, as 
shown by the Settlement Agreement, was in part the culmination of the lawsuit contesting 
the sale of URI. To portray the Stock Purchase Agreement as independent from the 
Settlement Agreement contorts the plain meaning of the Settlement Agreement and does 
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not comport with Jones and MTC's intent concerning the consideration they bargained 
for in negotiating the Settlement Agreement. 
To support their position, URI cites to State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1996) 
and Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1993) which URI claims stand for the 
proposition that where a plaintiff can make no showing of injury, he has no standing to 
sue. However, URTs analysis fails to acknowledge the axiomatic principal of contract 
law that where a party to a contract does not receive the performance bargained for, he 
has standing to sue to enforce the contract. 
Moreover, even if URI's theory were accepted on its face, URTs brief fails to 
complete the analysis, addressing only the first prong of what is actually a three-part test. 
The first step of the test is to assess whether the plaintiff has been adversely affected, 
and whether there is a causal connection between the adverse affect, the Defendant's 
actions, and the relief requested. Mace, 921 P.2d at 1379. While URI directs its attack at 
this step of the test, Jones and MTC submit that the adverse effect they have suffered is 
that they have not received the benefit of what they bargained for in the Settlement 
Agreement. The Defendants' alleged actions are the breach of that Agreement, and the 
relief requested is enforcement of the contract, or in the alternative, an award of actual or 
nominal damages, together with an award of attorneys fees. The causal connection 
between the injury, Defendants' conduct, and the remedy requested is thus apparent. 
Even if standing were not found under the first step of the test, however, the 
inquiry would not end. The Court would then analyze whether anyone else would have a 
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"more direct interest in the issues who can more adequately litigate the issues." Id. In 
this case, the only party in a better position to enforce the rights of the parties under the 
Settlement Agreement would be John Fife. As he is a defendant and the very officer of 
URI whose conduct has given rise to the current dispute, the Court may conclude that no 
other party is in a better position to enforce the rights of the parties to the Settlement 
Agreement. 
Finally, if there are no better litigants, the third step is to decide whether the issues 
raised by the Complaint are of sufficient importance to justify standing on their own 
merits. Id. In this case, the issues raised concern the performance of obligations clearly 
undertaken in a written Settlement Agreement. Jones and MTC submit that the 
importance of enforcing written agreements justifies allowing Jones and MTC access to 
the courts to pursue enforcement of the various agreements at issue. 
Beyond the standing issue, URI also seeks to justify the trial court's ruling by 
arguing that URI did not in fact breach its obligations with regard to the employment 
contract. First, URI espouses the position that the mere inclusion of a clause requiring a 
written agreement in the final Stock Purchase Agreement fully satisfied URI's obligations 
under the Settlement Agreement. Jones and MTC submit that this logic eviscerates the 
Settlement Agreement of all meaning. Indeed, if the logic of the Trial Court were applied 
to the other clauses expressly enumerated for inclusion in the Stock Purchase Agreement, 
URI could have avoided paying the first year's interest at closing (para. f(iv)), securing 
the Note by a pledge of IMC s URI stock (para. f(v)), having Fife personally guarantee 
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the Note (para. f(vi)), and so forth. Such was clearly not the intent of the parties to the 
Settlement Agreement, and such was certainly not what Jones and MTC bargained for in 
accepting and executing the Settlement Agreement. 
In this same vein, URI has made much of the fact that it has at least nominally 
complied with the requirement of hiring John Fife under a written employment contract. 
However, the record is clear that no such contract was entered until after Jones and MTC 
filed their lawsuit. Defendants attempt to obscure their failure to comply with the terms 
of the Stock Purchase Agreement by characterizing Jones and MTC's claim as one 
limited to displeasure concerning the timing of compliance only. Such is not the case. 
While Jones was on the Board of Directors of URI, he made repeated requests for URI to 
comply with the requirement of entering a written employment contract with Fife. His 
requests were met with silence and refusal. It was only in response to Jones and MTC's 
lawsuit that any action was ever taken. 
Defendants finally assert that their conduct with regard to the employment contract 
is protected under the "business judgment rule." That position fails for two reasons. 
First, the business judgment rule does not apply to contract claims. The rule protects 
corporate officers from "errors or mistakes in judgment pertaining to law or fact where 
they have acted on a matter calling for the exercise of their judgment or discretion, when 
they have used such judgment and have so acted in good faith." Financial Industrial 
Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 474 F.2d 514, 519 (10th Cir. 1973). It 
simply does not protect corporations or their boards from the consequences of breaching 
-7-
contracts. Second, to the extent the rule has any application to the facts of this case, the 
issue of URI's "good faith" would certainly be called into issue. The factual record 
contains substantial evidence of Jones' demands to URI to comply with the contract, and 
URTs persistent refusal to do so throughout the period. It is difficult to imagine how 
URTs obstructionist tactics in refusing to comply with the nondiscretionary requirements 
of the Settlement Agreement and Stock Purchase Agreement could be viewed by any 
court as constituting "good faith" as a matter of undisputed fact. 
In summary, URI obligated itself to enter a written employment agreement with 
Fife. Despite the persistent demands of Jones that it do so, URI brazenly refused to do so 
until after being served with this lawsuit. The Court erred in dismissing this claim on 
summary judgment, and the Judgment should be reversed in this regard and remanded to 
the trial court for adjudication on the merits. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS 
REGARDING THE WINDING UP OF URTS RELATIONSHIP WITH 
MGO. 
The parties do not dispute that the Settlement Agreement obligated URI to use 
"best efforts" to unwind the MGO relationship. The parties also agree that the MGO 
relationship was not wound up until August 1, 1998, when MGO's president verbally 
approved a written proposal made by Fife. Despite the fact that this "winding up" did not 
occur until more than two years after execution of the Settlement Agreement, the trial 
court found that URI presented "uncontroverted evidence that it had been in the process 
of unwinding the partnerships identified in the Settlement Agreement." The principal 
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thrust of URI's brief on the subject has been to restate this purportedly incontroverted 
evidence, which consists primarily of self-serving statements of URI principals regarding 
the complexity of the MGO relationships and the need for investigation before anything 
could be done. 
Jones and MTC submit that the trial court simply erred in failing to consider the 
substantial evidence presented to controvert URI's assertions. That evidence is described 
in detail on page 21 of Jones and MTC's principal brief, and will not be restated here. 
Jones and MTC would emphasize, however, that sufficient inferences to raise a disputed 
issue of fact as to URI's exercise of "best efforts" can be drawn from the simple fact that 
the entire process of winding up the relationships did not begin until immediately after 
the Court denied URI's initial motion to dismiss the claim in June of 1998, and the 
process was completed within five weeks. Neither the trial court nor URI has ever 
offered an explanation why this fact, together with the catalog of direct and 
circumstantial evidence produced by Jones and MTC, is not sufficient to call into dispute 
the factual question of whether URI had exercised its best efforts to unwind the 
relationships. 
In its opening brief, URI focuses on the meaning of "best efforts," and cites cases 
from the New York Court of Appeals and the Fifth Circuit where summary judgment was 
entered on a "best efforts" claim. URI then argues that the fact that it made some efforts 
was sufficient to constitute "best efforts" as a matter of law. The Utah Supreme Court, 
however, has held that even significant efforts undertaken by a party may not rise to the 
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level of having used "best efforts." Olympus Hills Shopping Center, LTD v. Landes, 821 
P.2d 451, 455-56 (Utah 1991). See also Sinajini v. Board of Education of the San Juan 
School District, 233 F.3d 1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that while "best efforts" 
does not obligate one to accomplish the task, it does constitute an enforceable legal 
standard). The determination of whether a party has met the standard of using "best 
efforts" is a factual inquiry reaching into subjective intent, similar to inquiries into good 
faith and specific intent. United Telecommunications, Inc. v. American Television and 
Communications Corp., 536 F.2d 1310, 1317 (10th Cir. 1976). Such inquiries into intent 
and motive are factual judgments generally inappropriate for summary judgment. See 
Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union v. Rollison, 615 F.2d 
788 (9th Cir. 1980). 
Jones and MTC submit that even if the Court were to accept URTs sketchy 
assertions that during the two years following the Settlement Agreement it was 
"investigating" the partnerships and "identifying" the assets of the partnerships and 
"taking steps" to wind things up, a fact finder may nevertheless infer simply from the 
timing of events that URI had failed to use best efforts. But the evidence in this case goes 
even further. Jones has presented substantial evidence calling into question whether URI 
had in fact done anything during that time period, including specific testimony that Fife 
expressly refused to consider paying money to MGO, even though he knew that payments 
may be necessary to wind up the relationships. Jones and MTC submit that in the case 
the fact finder must not only resolve the factual dispute concerning what URI actually 
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did, but it must then measure that conclusion against the language of the Settlement 
Agreement and determine whether the acts constitute URTs "best efforts" to unwind the 
relationships. 
Jones and MTC contend that the trial court erred in rejecting substantial evidence 
showing that URI failed to use its best efforts to unwind the MGO relationships. The 
evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom, particularly when viewed in a light 
favorable to Jones and MTC, present a disputed issue of fact that cannot properly be 
resolved on summary judgment. The Judgment of the trial court on this claim should be 
reversed and remanded to the trial court for a determination at trial.1 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING THE STOCK OPTION CLAIMS. 
The arguments set forth in URTs brief with respect to the stock option claims are 
adequately addressed in Jones and MTC's principal brief. Jones will not restate that 
argument here except to address briefly URTs assertion that Jones and MTC suffered no 
cognizable injury. Jones and MTC would point out that the law does not require any 
actual injury as an element of a contract case. A contract case is proven upon evidence of 
contract and breach. Where no actual damages have resulted, nominal damages are 
1URI also argues that the relevant provision of the Settlement Agreement was not 
intended to benefit Jones and MTC and that they are therefore not entitled to sue to enforce the 
provision. This assertion is not supported by any reference to case law or any limiting language in 
the contract. Jones and MTC submit that as parties to the Contract, they may sue to enforce its 
terms, and if the breach at issue has not resulted in any actual or substantial damages, they may 
recover nominal damages. Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667 
(Utah 1982). 
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awarded to enforce the terms of the contract. Turtle Management, Inc. v. Hagis 
Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982). In simplest terms, where URI has 
breached its contract with Jones and MTC, the fact of the breach itself is all the injury 
that need be proven in order for Jones and MTC to prevail. 
In its brief, URI weaves its discussion of "injury" into a further discussion of the 
business judgment rule. As set forth above, however, the business judgment rule does not 
excuse breaches of contract. Moreover, where the business judgment rule essentially 
calls for a "good faith" test relative to the conduct of URI in honoring the contract, the 
record does not support a holding that such "good faith" was established as a matter of 
law. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING JONES AND MTC'S 
CLAIMS FOR PAYMENT OF EXPENSES. 
The argumentation in URTs brief on the subject of Jones' unreimbursed expenses 
focuses primarily on the quality and the quantity of evidence presented on the subject. 
By its very nature, the discussion betrays the trial court's error in granting summary 
judgment in the face of factual record that gives rise to substantial issues of fact. 
With regard to the settlement expenses addressed in Jones and MTC's Fifth Claim 
for Relief, the parties do not dispute that only "pre-settlement" expenses are payable. 
Jones and MTC have submitted substantial sworn testimony of Jones and numerous hand-
written business records establishing their claim that certain pre-settlement expenses 
remain unpaid. In fact, the court tacitly acknowledges that Jones presented at least some 
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evidence of pre-settlement expenses by noting that "some of the costs submitted for 
reimbursement include expenses incurred after closing." On summary judgment, the 
evidence that there were at least some unpaid pre-settlement expenses should have been 
accepted in a light most favorable to Jones and MTC, and the Court should have drawn 
all inferences from that evidence in Jones and MTC's favor. Tretheway v. Miracle 
Mortgage, Inc., 995 P.2d 599 (Utah 2000). It was error for the trial court to ignore this 
evidence and its inferences, and hold that there were no unpaid expenses as a matter of 
law. 
With regard to the directors expenses, the parties do not appear to dispute that 
Jones incurred substantial expenses as a director of URI that were not reimbursed. The 
factual question at issue was whether URI had a policy in place that denied 
reimbursement unless expenses had been pre-approved. Not surprisingly, URTs 
principals all testified that URI had such policy, and that Jones was not entitled to 
reimbursement. The trial court agreed, and held that Jones had "not produced any 
evidence" to the contrary, and URTs brief merely reiterates this assertion. 
From Jones and MTC's perspective, the mystery of this matter is the fact that 
neither the trial court nor URI have ever offered an explanation why Jones' affidavit 
testimony, sworn out on personal knowledge as a former director of URI, may be 
disregarded on this issue. Without rehashing the facts set forth in the principal brief, 
Jones testified that he was a director and that there was no policy requiring pre-approval. 
He also testified that he personally observed that expenses of other directors were 
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routinely paid without pre-approval of any kind. In short, Jones offered substantial 
evidence that controverted, both directly and by inference, URTs evidence relating to 
reimbursement of director expenses.2 
As a general rule, "[a] single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of 
fact." Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1985) quoting, 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983). Moreover, on summary judgment, the court 
may not weigh the evidence or assess credibility, but must view all evidence and draw all 
inferences in a light favorable to the non-moving party. Id. In this case, it was simply 
error for the trial court to find that Jones' testimony was insufficient to outweigh the 
evidence offered by the URI principals. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING $162,028.87 OF COSTS 
AND ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE DEFENDANT. 
In the principal brief, Jones and MTC raise three issues with regard to attorneys 
fees. First, Jones & MTC argue that to the extent that the Third, Fourth, and Seventh 
Claims for Relief Judgment were dismissed on grounds of mootness, Jones was in fact the 
prevailing party. URI has responded to this argument primarily by questioning use of the 
term "mootness," and then by insisting that the stock options at issue were never 
2Without citation to the record, URI asserts in its footnote 5 that Jones' testimony in this 
regard is made uon information and belief." A review of the affidavit, the relevant parts of which 
are at pages 1102-1103 of the record, reveals that all allegations relating to this matter were made 
on personal knowledge. 
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exercised and had never been declared "valid or enforceable in the first instance." URI 
Brief, at 27. 
It is Jones and MTC's position that inclusion of the Stock Options in schedule 2.2 
of the Settlement Agreement constituted recognition of the options as valid and 
enforceable. Jones and MTC made due demand on URI to cancel the options, and URI, 
Hurd, and Brown refused to cancel or disclaim their rights under the options. On the day 
the lawsuit was filed, therefore, URI, Brown and Hurd all recognized the options as valid 
and enforceable. Only after the lawsuit was filed did Hurd and Brown agree to disclaim 
the options. In fact, Hurd and Brown disclaimed their options expressly in response to 
the lawsuit. 
It is clear that the trial court based its dismissal of the stock options claims in 
substantial part upon its view that because Brown and Hurd had waived their interest in 
the options, "the issue would be moot". (R. 1520). Jones and URI apparently disagree 
with the trial court's use of the term "moot," but they offer no evidence that absent the 
lawsuit, Brown and Hurd would have waived their options. Jones and MTC submit that 
if the stock option claims are dismissed based exclusively on Brown and Hurd having 
now waived their rights, then Jones and MTC must be deemed the prevailing parties since 
URTs compliance resulted from the filing of the lawsuit. As such, Jones and MTC 
should be awarded fees, and not URI. 
Second, Jones and MTC have argued that the fee award should be allocated among 
the claims, with no recovery allowed for the claims on which recovery was imavailable or 
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for issues on which URI did not ultimately prevail. As to the claims where recovery was 
unavailable, Jones and MTC have argued that their Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Claims for 
Relief are not founded on contract, and are therefore not subject to the attorneys fees 
provision of the Settlement Agreement. Defendants rely on Dejavue, Inc. v. US. Energy 
Corp, 993 P.2d 222,227 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) for the proposition that factually related 
claims, when prevailed upon, form the basis for awarding attorneys' fees on all the 
claims. However, Dejavue requires that the claims arise from "a common core of facts 
and involve[] related legal theories." Id, quotingDurant v. Independent Sch Dist. No. 
16, 990 F.2d 560, 566 (10th Cir. 1993). Furthermore, full recovery depends on the party's 
success on a "significant, interrelated claim." Id_, quoting, Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 
1505, 1512 (10th Cir. 1995). 
In the case at hand, the claims at issue share neither a common set of facts nor 
related legal theories. Plaintiffs' Claims One through Five and Seven all arise from the 
Settlement Agreement and Stock Purchase Agreement and allege a breach of contract. 
Claim Six arises from the settlement of the lawsuits predating the Settlement Agreement 
and alleges that the Defendants made fraudulent representations to induce Jones and 
MTC to enter the Settlement Agreement. It is based on misrepresentation and arises in 
tort. Claims Eight and Nine allege breaches of fiduciary duties of various URI officers, 
and sound in tort. Claim Ten is a separate claim based on the facts and circumstances 
surrounding URI's failure adequately to reimburse Jones for expenses he incurred as in 
service on the URI Board of Directors. This claims has nothing to do with the Settlement 
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Agreement or the Stock Purchase Agreement. Jones and MTC submit that the trial court 
erred in refusing to allocate the fees among these claims and adjust the fee award 
accordingly. 
With respect to Jones and MTC's assertion that URI should not recover fees 
incurred pursuing unsuccessful issues, the parties agree that Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 
P.2d 305 (Utah 1998) is perhaps the most pertinent Utah case on the subject, but differ as 
to interpretation of that case. Jones and MTC submit that the discussion in the principal 
brief is sufficient to state their position on the matter, but would emphasize that in 
Valcarce, the court expressly held that it was error to award the full amount of fees where 
some of the time was spent pursuing unsuccessful issues. Id. at 318. 
Jones and MTC's third argument relative to the fee award is that the trial court 
failed to adjust the fees charged by URI's Chicago counsel to reflect reasonable billing 
rates in Utah. URI's brief suggests that term "in the locality," as used in Barker v. Utah 
Public Service Commission, 970 P.2d 702 (Utah 1998) has not been defined by the Utah 
Supreme Court, and argues that the term should be construed broadly to allow attorneys 
practicing in Utah to charge rates that are reasonable in the locality of their home office. 
Jones and MTC submit that a fair reading of Barker requires that the term "in the 
locality" be given its plain meaning of in the locality of the Court where the action is 
pending. 
URI suggests that Utah's open court policy would dictate that out-of-state 
attorneys be allowed to recover fees at their out-of-state billing rate. However, Jones and 
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URI would submit that requiring out-of-state attorneys to submit to reasonable local 
billing rates is no more of a burden than is requiring such attorneys to be admitted to 
practice in the state, and to agree to abide by the local rules of professional conduct and 
rules of the court. In short, Jones and MTC contend that Barker requires courts to adjust 
billing rates of out-of-state counsel to meet the standard of reasonableness for the Salt 
Lake market. Since this was not done in this case, the award should be vacated and 
remanded for a new determination. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in their principal brief, Jones and MTC request 
that the Summary Judgment granted against them be reversed, and the matter be returned 
to the trial court for further proceedings. 
DATED this r / / r day of March, 2002. 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C. 
At 
Laiijbert\| 
Attorney for Jones and MTC 
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